Since most of my research has been in the area of moral philosophy and very little in the philosophy of law, I will have more to say in regard to the first question than in relation to the second.
Let us consider the first question: Should animals have moral standing? What would it be for an animal not to have moral standing, not to count for anything morally whatsoever?
Consider an example: Joe gets his kicks out of clubbing calves.
He just loves to smash the heads of calves.
To say that the calves have no moral standing would be to say that they count for nothing moral ly.
It would mean that Joe does nothing wrong as far as the calves themselves are concernedi although physically damaged, the calves could not be morally harmed, they could not be morally injured.
The calves would not be the subjects of interests which could in any way be violated. And if Joe did all of his head smashing on a deserted island with no other"hUIll3D. beings around to either see or hear about these clubbings, Joe's actions would, from the moral standpoint, be completely neutral.
They would be what we might call "amoral," that is, without any moral significance whatsoever.
The history of Western culture and phil osophy reveals a very persistent tendency to say "no" to the question:
Should animals have moral standing?
The Greeks, including Plato and especially Aristotle, said "no": on the basis of the criterion of rationality. Only rational beings are to count for some thing morally. Only hUIll3D.s are rational. Animals are not rational. Therefore, animals should count for nothing morally, and animals should be used as instruments to serve the interest of rational hUIll3D.s.
Aristotle him self was quite rational, but he was also convinced that many hUIll3D.s were not rational or, at least, not very rational, especially female humans and slave humans. so, he ra tionally drew the conclusion that both sexism and slavery were justified.
Not only within the Greek philosophical tradition but also within orthodox Christian ity, there has been a persistent denial of the moral standing of animals.
The most prominent and clear example was in the thir teenth century:
st. Thomas Aquinas. Blend ing Aristotelianism with the daninion theory of the Bible, Aquinas claimed that by divine providence the animals are intended for human use, and, therefore, it is not wrong for hUIll3D.s to make use of animals, either by killing or in any other way whatever.
True, St. Thomas was against cruelty to animals. But the only reason, or at least the basic reason, he was against cruelty was that if humans are cruel to animals, then they will, he thought, as a matter of fact, tend to be cruel to other human beings • Given that Joe smashes calves' heads on a deserted island, Aquinas would be canmitted to the view that nothing wrong is done to the calves. The action would be morally indifferent as far as the calves are concerned.
In the seventeenth century, the influen tial French philosopher Rene Descartes cate gorically denied that animals should have any moral standing.
Since animals are soulless, are mindless machines, as mechanical as PHILOSOPHY clocks, it is impossible that animals could be hurt. When Joe clubs calves, they feel no IlOre pain that does a clock when it is smashed. Calves have no awareness, no con sciousness, no ability to experience either pain or pleasure.
It follows, then, that it is impossible that an animal could be IlOrally hanned or benefitted.
Another Western philosoI,iler of enorllOus influence was the eighteenth century Gennan, Imnanuel Kant. His philosophy has been espe cially important in developing the foundation for human rights.
For example, the human right to life, the human right not to be hanned, the human right to freedom. Kant claimed that only rational, self-conscious human beings counted for anything IlOrally. Kant is fallOus for his Categorical Impera tive, which goes something like this: ra tional self-conscious human beings should always be treated as ends in themselves and never as mere means, never as mere instru mental resources.
All other beings, includ ing all animals, could and should be used as mere means to serve the interest of the self conscious, rational humans. To be sure, Kant was against cruelty to animals--but for ex actly the same reasons given by St. Thomas. Cruelty to animals, he thought, would have a tendency to result in humans being cruel to humans.
For example, the clubbed calves counted for nothing whatever IlOrally in and of themselves.
And on a deserted island, Joe's head-smashing activities would be can pletely aIlOral as far as the calves are con cerned, without any IlOral significance what soever.
There are other theories which have an swered "no" to our first question, but we do not have time to explore them. Let us take a look at the theories which say "yes" to the question:
Should animals have IlOral standing?
These two theories are utilitari anism and the IlOral right theory.
These two theories are both negative and positive. They are negative in that they criticize the former theories which deny any IlOral stand ing to animals, and they are positive in that they· attempt to provide theories which will serve as a basis for giving IlOral standing to animals.
Let us first briefly consider criticisms of the past "no-sayers." Aristotle's ration ality criterion is both too narrow and too broad.
It is too narrow in that human in fants and severely retarded humans are not rational, but we are convinced that human infants and the severely retarded should count for something IlOrally. It is too broad in that behavioral and ecological studies are leading to the conclusion that many animals have some rational capacity.
Psychologist David Premack has given serious consideration to the hypothesis that primates have the concept of causality and that they make inferences on the basis of this concept.
[I] St. Thomas Aquinas' theory, being a theological theory, has all the weak nesses that theological theories, finally based on faith, have.
They can produce no rational grounds for accepting. the theory • Other religions have recognized the IlOral standing of animals, for example, Buddhism and Hinduism.
Which re~igion is correct? And even if one were to accept the theologic al dominion theory, the view that humans were given rule over the animals, there are two opposed interpretations of the concept "do minion." Does "daninion" mean rule over the animals for the sake of humans?
We might call this "the tyrannical interpretation" of dominion.
Or does the concept "daninion" mean rule over the animals for the sake of the animals?
We might call this "the stew ardship interpretation." St. Thomas gave the tyrannical interpretation, but there are contemporary theologians who argue that the stewardship interpretation is rrbre correct.
Or, consider Imnanuel Kant's theory' based on rationality and self-consciousness. This has also been criticized as being both too narrow and too broad. His theory would result in two-week old human infants and severely retarded humans counting for nothing IlOrally.
This criterion is too broad--from the perspective of anthropocentric tradition --in that i·t would give IlOral standing to many animals.
The I,ililosoI,ilers Peter Singer [ 2] and Tan Regan [3] have effectively argued that many animals are capable of intentional behavior and that intentional behavior necessitates some self-consciousness, at least an aware ness of oneself as being distinct from other things in the environment, and also awareness of oneself as enduring through time, past, present, and future.
Descartes' machine theory of animals has been heavily and decisively, I believe, cri ticized by both scientists and philosophers. Given the silllilarities of the nerve and brain structures and in behaviors of animals and humans, there is strong evidence to reject the Cartesian theory.
Evolutionists empha size the survival value implicit in the capa city to experience pleasure and pain. How could pain and pleasure have survival value i f the animals experience no pain or plea sure?
Having briefly considered the criticisms of the "no-saying" theories, let us now take a look at the two kinds of theories held by those who say "yes" to the question: Should animals have m::>ral standing? First, utilitarianism:
Jeremy Bentham (eighteenth and nineteenth century, English) and John stuart Mill (nineteenth century, English, and a follower of Bentham) systema tically developed the classical utilitarian theory. The fundamental themes of utilitari anism include the following:
All and only pleasure is good in and of itself.
All and only pain is bad or evil in and of itself;
In all their actions, m::>ral agents should act in such a way as to maximize the net balance of pleasure over pain for all sentient beings in any way affected by the action. Using these fundamental utilitarian princi pIes, Jeremy Bentham wrote the often-quoted sentence:
The question is not can animals reason, not can they talk or use language, but can they suffer? can they enjoy? Bentham answered these last questions, ~ they suffer?, ~ they enjoy?, affinnatively. John stuart Mill agreed with him, and Peter Singer, the internationally respected philo sopher and author of Animal Liberation [4] , is in fundamental agreement with Bentham and Mill.
The m::>ral theory underpinning Peter Singer's argument in his very influential Animal Liberation is utilitarianism. All animals are equal, argues Singer; that is, equal pains in animals and humans should count equally m::>rally.
And equal pleasures in animals and humans should also count equally m::>rally.
Therefore, all sentient animals (by "sentient animals," I mean ani mals having the capacity to experience pain and pleasure) do have m::>ral standing.
Singer concludes that the net balance of
Singer also concludes that the elimination of m::>st of the current experimentation on animals would maximize the net balance of pleasure over pain for all sentient beings--once again, human and nonhu man--affected.
For the utilitarian, Joe's activity of smashing calves' heads on a de serted island would be an action with m::>ral significance, or perhaps better, ilrmoral significance.
All
The concept of m::>ral rights is a fairly rrodern concept, performing sane of the functions of the older "natural rights" concept, but with an attempt to eliminate some of the historic al and conceptual connection between natural right and early Greek and Ronan metaphysical views. Also, an attempt is made to stay away from a theological foundation which has been stressed as a basis for natural rights.
There is much controversy currently over the question of m::>ral rights, not only at the level of animal !!Oral rights but also in regard to human moral rights.
The following examples are frequently presented as being strong candidates for moral rights: the right to life, the right not to be harmed, and the right to freedom. Moral rights theorists call our attention to the faIIDUS passage in the Declaration of Independence:
All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. AIlOng these rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In this passage, we can detect three thanes in relation to IOC>ral rights:
Moral rights are universal; that is, they apply to all humans, regardless of time or place.
Moral rights are equal; that is, if any two beings have moral rights, they possess them equally--you cannot have !!Ore or less of a !!Oral right to life than I do.
Moral rights are inalienable, that is, they cannot be transferred fran or sold or given away.
It is controversial how best to define a nnral right. I would like to suggest, preli minarily, the following definition:
to say that a being S has a nnral right to x means that S has a valid claim to x, a claim which is enforceable against others in virtue of moral sanctions and principles. [5] Ronald Dworkin, in his book Taking Rights SeriouslY, [6] Regan claims that humans do have moral rights, including the right to life, the right to freedcm, and the right not to be harmed.
The nnst plausible criterion for nnral rights possession by humans is a cri7" terion also met by nnst animals.
Therefore, he draws the conclusion that nnst animals, all mamnals, perhaps all birds, have nnral rights.
That's the structure of his argu ment.
Regan's arguments are both negative and positive.
He has negative arguments criti cizing past and canpeting criteria for the possession of nnral rights.
His positive arguments are presented in defense of the criterion which he accepts.
In answer to those who claim that rights are based on a divine gift, Regan shows that such a claim can have no rational evidence, since it is ultimately based only on faith. In answer to those who attempt to base rights on the capa city to use language, Regan argues that this criterion will exclude many humans fran rights (infants and the severely retarded) and will include sane animals (ch:irnpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, porpoises, etc.). In answer to those who attempt to base rights on the capacity to reason, Regan again argues that this will leave out many humans and will include sane animals. In answer to those who try to ground rights on the ability to choose freely, Regan concludes that this, too, will exclude many humans and include many animals. And in answer to those who use the criterion of self-consciousness, Regan argues that this, too, excludes many humans and includes many animals.
Regan's general negative con clusion is that it is impossible to develop a rational, consistent criterion for nnral rights which will include all humans but exclude all animals.
In his positive argument, Regan develops what he considers to be the nnst adequate criterion to serve as a basis for possessing nnral rights. In sUlllllaIy form, this criteri on is as follows:
a being which has inherent value has nnral rights. and any being has inherent value if it satisfies the following three conditions:
such a being has interests; such a being can be benefitted or hanned; and such a being is the subject of a life which can be better or worse for it, indepen dently of any other being valuing it or find ing it to be useful. Regan canes to the conclusion that this nnst satisfactory basis for nnral rights will include virtually all humans (the status of a pennanently ccmatose individual, like Karen Ann Quinlan, is left an open question) but it will also include nnst ani.mals: all nonnal, mature mamnals, probably all normal, mature birds, and probably still others. And as far as human treatment of animals is concerned, Regan concludes that vegetarianism is nnrally obligatory, and that the elimination of ex perimentation which harms animals is also nnrally obligatory.
Therefore, it follows that Joe's smashing calves' heads on the d;eserted island would be violating the calves' nnral rights: the right to life, the right not to be hanned, and the right to freedan.
Given that I am not a specialist in the fhilosofhy of law, IT.rf cemnents will, neces sarily, be brief in regard to the second basic question posed at the beginning of this discussion; Should animals have legal stand ing?
First, it is important to consider two preliminary questions: Do animals already have legal rights?
Do animals already have legal standing?
The Animal Welfare Institute in Washing ton, D.C., has recenUy published ~ book entiUed Animals and Their ~ Rights. [8] '!his tiUe seems to presume that animals already do have legal rights.
Considered in this book are anti-cruelty laws and laws governing transportation, caging, slaughter, etc. These laws do give animals sane protec tion, but just fran the fact that laws pro tect sanething, it does not follow that that which is protected has any legal rights. For example, there are laws protecting the Golden Gate Bridge, but it does not follow that this bridge has any legal rights, that this bridge has interests which can be represented in legal actions. I think we must conclude that animals do not have any legal rights in cur rent American law.
Nor do they have legal standing.
Is
legal standing for animals ever thinkable?
Does it even make conceptual sense to try to talk about legal standing for animals, or is such talk prre nonsense? Joel Feinberg, a philosoIher at the University of Arizona, has effectively argued that such talk is thinkable. [9] If legal rights are to be essentially connected with interests and if it makes sense to say that a squirrel has interests, then why isn't it at least think able that a squirrel could have legal rights and that the interests of the squirrel could be represented by an agent or a guardian in a court of law?
True, squirrels do not have the ability to make their own claims, but neither do human infants, and human infants do have legal rights. ChristoIher stone's important book, Should Trees Have Standing?, is relevant here. [10] Stone wresUes with the question: Is it thinkable that a forest or wilderness could have legal rights?
Stone concludes that it is thinkable, because a forest could meet the three criteria which Stone emIha sizes as being sufficient for legal standing: a forest could institute legal action in its behest through a guardian; a court could take injury to the forest into account in determining the granting of legal relief I and the relief granted by the court could run to the benefit of the forest.
If corporations and ships can have legal standing--and they do-then why could not forests? If legal standing is thinkable for a forest, then surely legal standing is thinkable for squirrels and dolIhins.
What is the relationship between morals and lawS?
More specifically, we could ask: What is the relationship between moral rights and legal rights? Between moral standing and legal standing?
There is a popl1ar saying: it is impossible to legislate morality.
I'm not sure exactly what this statement means, but I do think there is a sense in which this is a false claim.
Not only do morals have a significant influence on law, but law also has a significant influence on morals.
For exanple, consider the strong Minnesota law prohibiting SIlOking in public areas.
I sus pect that the moral right not to be banned by others played a significant role in the pass age of this law.
Once the law was passed, there was much criticism and grumbling on the part of the SIlOkers and eIIl?loyers and rest aurant owners, but this law is having a very noticeable effect on the moral attitudes and beliefs of the general public.
There is a sense in which morals can be legislated.
As already indicated, the Declaration of Inde pendence emIhasized three moral rights: the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the prrsuit of hawiness. These moral rights have had a profound influ ence on American law.
Ronald Dworkin, again in Taking Rights Seriously, argues that it is impossible to separate law fran morality.
Part of his argument consists of his claim that it is impossible for judges to decide hard cases without appealing to moral principle, which are not explicit, within the laws themselves. The principle of justice or fairness, for example, is a moral principle which is often used to overturn certain rules that were expliciUy adopted by l a~ bodies.
In denying the possibility of separating morals fran law, Dworkin is attacking the position called "legal positivism:" the view which claims that there is no such thing as moral rights, that the only rights which exist are legal rights, those rights specifically adopted by legislatures and that can be found in statutes.
How similar is the legal position of animals to the legal position of human slaves?
I am currenUy doing preliminary research on a book to be entiUed Human Slavery and Animal Slavery.
One chapter would deal with slavery law, the law govern ing human slaves and the law governing animal --------------slaves.
Most people have never thought of the concept of "animal slavery."
At first hearing it seems p.IZzling, but I am convinced that the parallel between the two types of slavery is very enlightening.
Slaves, be they htnnaIl or animal, are property.
The htnnaIl slave, being property, can make no contract~ neither can animal slaves.
All animals, according to the West ern tradition, are owned~ even the wild ani mals are owned by the public.
A htnnaIl slave cannot own property.
How could property own property?
Neither can animal slaves own property.
A htnnaIl slave cannot testify in court against a non-slave. How could proper ty testify?
Neither can an animal slave testify. A htnnaIl slave cannot sue the slave holder.
How could property sue its owner? Neither can animal slaves sue their owners.
In general, we can conclude that htnnaIl slaves have no legal standing, since they are essen tially property.
The same conclusions hold for animal slaves.
There are also important, illuminating parallels between the abolition of htnnaIl slavery and the anticipated abolition of animal slavery:
"animal liberation." Major shifts in classical philosophical and theolo gical views were required before htnnaIl slaves could achieve IlDral standing.
PhilosoI;bers are now exploring further shifts which recog nize the IlDral standing of animals. Theolo gians and clergy will find it necessary to re-examine and re-interpret doctrines affect ing the relation between htnnaIls and animals. Public attitudes toward animals IIUlSt--and will-change to the point where animal liber ation can become a viable political issue, the final result being the recognition of the legal standing of individual animals.
Notes

